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The issue of human bombing, which is popularly known as suicide bombing has become important in the Western world since the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. Since then the issue of human bombing has become important to academia, the media, and security experts. This interest has resulted in much literature 
attempting to explain why human bombings take place and what motivates the bombers; for instance, the 
works of Gambetta (2006); Pape (2006); Merari (2010); Hafez (2006, 2007); Wright (2007); Bloom (2005, 
2010); Friedman (2005); and Khosrokhavar (2005).
In this short paper I do not discuss why[1] and how human bombing occurs, and instead argue three 
points. Firstly, that human bomber cannot be acting with sacred intention (in the path of God) because 
this intention is unknown to them and the groups that advocate such attacks; secondly, that the standard 
for sacred intention is impossible to uphold by the bombers; finally that, the bombers could be suffering 
from secondary trauma, therefore falling outside the criteria that legitimates human bombing because of 
the individuals illness. I contend that these points serve to dissolve the religious criteria and justification for 
human bombing.
Human bombing: In the path of God
In their martyrdom videos human bombers state that they are acting in the path of God. According to Abu 
Qatada al-filistini [2] (from here on will use Abu Qatada) what makes the intention sacred are the benefits 
the act will bring to the community (Hafez 2007: 129-131). Sacred intention is very important, such that 
any behavior or motivation other than the sacred can serve to dissolve religious legitimization. Abu Qatada 
contends that intentionality is anchored in the notion of Muslim interests, and gives many examples of 
hadiths that he relates to the justification for human bombing (Abu Qatada al-Falastini, 1995). Abu Qatada 
notes:
Plunging into enemy ranks cannot be done for its own sake. It must contain a benefit for Islam and 
Muslims. In other words, martyrdom is never simply for its sake; its goal must be to raise God’s word 
on earth and advance the cause of Muslims (Hafez 2007: 131).
However, even if the act, as Abu Qatada contends becomes sacred because of the benefits it brings to 
Muslims, it does not mean that the motivations of the bomber were sacred. In the many hadiths that Abu 
Qatada quotes and the commentary he gives on them, there is no mention of how one is to verify if the 
intentions of the bomber are sacred. From the criteria detailed by Abu Qatada it seems that one has to 
accept the word of the bomber and the group that the individual has volunteered for the mission, he or she 
had no psychological problems and was entirely motivated to act in the path of God. At face value it may 
seem feasible to accept what the bomber and the group contend because both enclose the motivations in 
Islamic terminology. However, once the motivations and the terminology are interrogated a different picture 
emerges, one that cannot be upheld by the prerequisite criteria that legitimizes a human bombing as sacred.
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Academics such as Merari (2006), Pape (2006) and Hafez (2007) argue that human bombers are motivated by 
nationalistic ideas and redemption for themselves, their family, friends, community or religion. This suggests 
that human bombers are motivated by reasons other than Islamic ones, even though they may strike fear 
into the enemy and bring benefits to Muslims. However, there are also other motivations, which are more 
important to the argument of this paper, and these concern the personal reasons for becoming a human 
bomber in both conflict and non-conflict zones.
Bloom, in her 2002 book titled Bombshell, notes that personal problems stemming from being involved 
in activities that have brought shame on to their families leave some Chechen females feeling that they 
have no choice but to become human bombers. The act, as Bloom (2011: 30-31) argues, allows the women 
to reinvent themselves and become a source of pride for their families, removing the stigma of shame. 
Khosrokhavar (2005) makes a similar point with reference to the Palestinian human bombers, stating that 
death ‘allows martyrs to recover their spiritual virginity, to wash away their sins, thanks to an enchanted 
martyrdom that opens the gates of paradise... A beautifying death releases them from their everyday 
humiliation‘(Khosrokhavar 2005: 133). It seems, then that human bombers are escaping from their 
socio-political conditions and in doing so are taking control over their bodies, their fate, and their future 
representation because these are denied to them in their everyday life. If we accept that the motivations 
of the bombers are personal, this means that there acts were not carried out in the interests of the Muslim 
community, even though the outcome may prove to bring benefit to some Muslims. This undermines the 
criteria as set out by Abu Qatada and therefore the intentions are not sacred.
Devji makes a similar observation to Khosrokhavar (2005):
Martyrdom constitutes the moment of absolute humanity, responsibility and freedom as a self- 
contained act shorn of off all teleology. Martyrdom, then, might well constitute the purest and 
therefore the most ethical of acts, because in destroying himself its solider becomes fully human by 
assuming complete responsibility for his fate beyond the reach of any need, interest or idea (Devji 
2005: 120).
Devji alludes to the idea that martyrdom frees the bomber from the shackles of Islamic proofs and defers 
responsibility and justification from the bomber; meaning that the act becomes self-referential and there is 
no need for a sacred text to act as a motivation. Devji (2005: 122) makes another interesting point concerning 
the monotheistic figures of Ibrahim and Ishmael, with both acting upon uncertainty, and obeying out of 
trust, rather than evidence of God, which makes God’s existence possible. Devji here is pointing out the 
importance of acting out of belief rather than evidence. The same explanation can be used to understand 
human bombers. The death of the bomber is an expression of absolute uncertainty because it is based on trust 
rather than absolute evidence of God’s path, the beneficial outcomes of the act or the possibility of afterlife. 
The bomber can only know and be certain of their sociopolitical circumstances and the need to act.
Aside from the issues concerning uncertainty there is also a problem with the groups claiming that they 
know the intention of the human bomber, and it being entirely sacred. For example Merari (2010: 128) notes 
in the case of Palestinian and Israeli conflict that religion is a relatively unimportant factor in the motivation 
of human bombers. However, for Al Zawahiri human bombings appear to be legitimate and Islamically 
justified:
A generation of mujahedeen that has decided to sacrifice itself and its property in the cause of God. 
That is because the way of death and martyrdom is a weapon that tyrants and their helpers, who 
worship their salaries instead of God, do not have (Wright 2007: 219).
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In the above quote Al Zawahiri seems to be claiming two things. Firstly, that the intention of the bombers 
to sacrifice themselves is in the path of God. Secondly, that he has absolute knowledge of the intentions of 
the bombers and the path of God. In stating this, he and groups that advocate and use human bombings 
as a weapon are arguing that they know the mind of God, thus they elevate their knowledge to the level of 
God. By logical extension, this means that they are God. In claiming such knowledge they have committed a 
blasphemous act, which places them outside the fold of Islam.
The groups attempt to resolve these issues, place themselves back into the fold of Islam, and convert intention 
into sacred intention in an interesting way. I contend that the groups have reconstructed ‘God’ into one that 
will justify human bombings. In order to do this, the groups convert the various acts that inform phrases, 
such as ‘acting in the path of God’, and the benefits of such acts to Muslims, into symbolical representations 
of God through projective identification and cast this into the future. Consequently, the symbolic God then 
provides the sacred intention, justifications and ways to pursue the ‘path of God’.
The key features of human bombing seem to be everything but sacred. The motivations appear to be personal 
and arguments for their sacredness are full of uncertainty. As Asad (2007) argues, the best explanation 
for the motivations of human bombers is the assertion that the bombers may not even be certain of his 
or her motivations. The other entail issues concerning the groups that they claim to know the intentions 
of the bomber and the path of God are central in determining whether the act of human bombing can be 
authenticated as Islamically permissible. As I have detailed above these intentions are un-knowable by the 
groups, yet they claim to know both, taking them outside Islam. The groups overcome both problems by 
using a rhetorical device that reconstructs ‘God’ to justify the bombing and provide the sacred intention.
The standard for acting in God’s path is too high to reach
As we have seen in the previous section it is difficult to ascertain if the bombers intentions are scared. In this 
section I contend that even if we accept that the bomber has sacred intention it is impossible to uphold. I 
base my argument on an incident that took place during the battle of the ‘Ditch’ involving the fourth Caliph, 
which clearly demonstrates that intention derived from anger and revenge nullify sacredness. I use extracts 
from the 2006 Transatlantic Airline plotters martyrdom videos to support this argument.
The incident outlined above was a fight, between Ali the fourth Caliph and Amr bin Abdu Wud, the 
champion from the Quraish tribe. At one point Amr bin Abdu Wud found himself in precarious position 
with Ali sitting on his chest, from which position Ali asked him to embrace Islam, however Amr bin Abdu 
Wud refused and spat on Ali. In response to this, Ali ‘rose calmly from Amr’s chest, wiped his face, and stood 
a few paces away, he gazed solemnly at his adversary, and responded by saying, ‘’O’ Amr, I only kill in the way 
of Allah and not for any private motive. Since you spat in my face, my killing you now may be from a desire 
for personal vengeance. So I spare your life. Rise and return to your people’’ (Grande Strategy 2012).
If we consider the motivations of the foiled 2006 Transatlantic Airline plotters we see that they were 
motivated by their anger and the necessity to gain revenge, and redemption and gain the rewards of the 
afterlife. For example perpetrator, Umar Islam stated in his martyrdom video that, ‘this is revenge for the 
actions of the USA in the Muslim lands and their accomplices such as the British and the Jews. As you kill, 
you will be killed. And if you want to kill our women and children then the same thing will happen to you… 
We are doing this in order to gain the pleasure of our Lord and Allah loves us to die and kill in his path’ (BBC 
4 April 2008). Tanvir Hussain, another member of the plot, stated in his video, ‘I only wish I could do this 
again, you know come back and do this again, and just do it again and again until people come to their senses 
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and realise, you know, don’t mess with the Muslims’ (BBC 4 April 2008). In the cases of Umar Islam and 
Tanvir Hussain, anger, revenge and redemption for Muslims play a big role in their motivations.
Comparing the incident involving the fourth Caliph to the 2006 Transatlantic Airline plotters, we see that the 
Caliph decided not to kill Amr bin Abdu Wud because the act would have been carried out during a moment 
of anger; by contrast, the intentions of the plotters seem to be determined by anger and the need to seek 
revenge. For the Caliph acting out of anger is incompatible with acting in the path of God, thus emotions 
such as anger cannot play a role in sacred intention. If emotions such as anger and revenge become part of 
the bombers intention, I contend this nullifies the sacredness of them.
Vicarious trauma and human bombers
In the previous sections I have argued that the intention of human bombers cannot be considered as sacred, 
and acting with sacred intention is such that sacredness is impossible to uphold. In this final section I make a 
tentative claim that both successful and foiled human bombers that lived in the UK could have been suffering 
from secondary trauma, as a consequence of visiting conflict zones and from watching videos detailing 
Muslims enduring violence. Secondary trauma, as Speckhard (2012) notes, is traumatization occurring 
vicariously through empathetic engagement with a victim of trauma by visiting conflict-zones or watching 
videos detailing violence and suffering. Aid workers and therapists, for example experience secondary trauma 
because they start to identify with the victims of traumatic events (Pulido 2012).
By forwarding secondary trauma as an explanation I am discussing two things. Firstly, if we accept that 
human bombers were suffering from secondary trauma, and it is a clinical condition, they are fulfilling the 
criteria of sacred intention as set out by Abu Qatada. Secondly, that the emotional conditions generated by 
trauma may act as mechanisms for one to acquire and act upon extreme ideas as an antidote to the trauma. 
This leads to two further questions, which are possibly more important but difficult to answer, at least in 
this paper. The first is more general to Muslims: are there a specific constellation of experiences that we can 
argue produce ‘Muslim trauma’ and how does this manifest itself in the lives of Muslims that experience the 
trauma? The second is specific to terrorism and especially human bombing in non-conflict zones: to what 
severity does one have to experience secondary trauma in order to propel them to become a human bomber.
From Abu Qatada’s criteria for what constitutes a legitimate martyrdom operation it is clear that someone 
suffering from any form psychological illness cannot take part or be considered a martyr (Abu Qatada, 1995). 
From the work of Speckhard (2012) and the various media reports documenting the journeys that successful 
and foiled human bombers took makes it appear that the bombers had experienced secondary trauma. 
However, in the case of the UK human bombers, we see that they experienced secondary trauma through the 
combination of contact with victims of traumatic events and by watching videos detailing Muslims enduring 
traumatic events. Speckhard (2007) notes that:
We find that in nonconflict zones the traumas that are occurring in conflict zones are used to 
motivate potential recruits. This tactic makes use of the concept of secondary traumatization in 
which witnessing film clips or photos of real or misconstrued injustices are used to create a traumatic 
state in the one witnessing it so much so that the outrage and trauma can motivate them to take 
action on behalf of the victim(s) of such injustice(s).
In the cases of the 7/7 bombers and the foiled 2006 Transatlantic plot we see that they not only visited conflict 
zones but also watched videos displaying the suffering of their brethren. This combination fostered secondary 
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identification with the victims such that, it not only compelled them to acquire extreme ideas but also act 
upon them. In the transcription (see below) of the martyrdom video of Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the 
7/7 bombers, we see that he strongly identified with, and seems to have been deeply affected by the suffering 
of his Muslim brethren:
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and 
your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting 
and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our target. Until you 
stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight. We are 
at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation (The Sunday Times 2 
September 2005)
Although Khan has not been a victim of any traumatic event, enduring the suffering of others vicariously 
seems to have played a significant role in him deciding to become a human bomber. Khan’s vicarious 
experience not only made him feel humiliated and angry but also fomented a desire in him to gain revenge. 
In the martyrdom video of Shehzad Tanweer, another of the 7/7 bombers, he states:
I know they’ve killed and maimed civilians in their strikes because I’ve seen it with my own eyes, my brothers 
have seen it, I’ve carried the victims in my arms; women, children, toddlers, babies in their mother’s wombs.
Like Khan, Tanweer’s video transcript clearly indicates his identification with his Muslim brethren and that 
he has been intensely affected by the suffering he has witnessed. His experiences suggest that he could have 
been suffering from secondary trauma similar to that which Speckhard (2012) details in discussing what 
leads a person to become a human bomber in conflict-zones.
The cases of the 2006 Transatlantic Plot members follow a similar trajectory. Abdulla Ahmed Ali, the 
ringleader of the plot, stated during his trial that in 2002 he went to a refugee camp in Pakistan to help 
refugees fleeing from the US attacks. He recalls his experience and details the harrowing effect that it had on 
him:
There were lots of deaths in the camps daily. We had to go to a lot of funerals daily. It was mostly 
kids that were dying, children, young children. He had been interested in politics since he was a 
teenager. When I was about 15 or 16 I remember the Bosnian war going on and I remember images 
of concentration camps, of people looking like skeletons and things like that. I was aware they 
were Muslims’ (Guardian 8 September 2009).
Ali clearly indicates the impact of working in a refugee camp and watching videos of the Bosnian war that 
detailed Muslim suffering. Two significant issues emerge from Ali’s trial: the suffering of children and the 
images from the Bosnian concentration camps. The impact of the camps on Muslims in the UK has been 
grossly underestimated. Islamists that I have interviewed noted that the Bosnian war and the consequent 
suffering of Muslims was a watershed moment regarding their thinking on what it means to be a Muslim in 
Europe. The camps were Muslim where held during the war also reminded the interviewees of the WWII 
holocaust.
Although the members of the foiled 2004 Crevice plot were not human bombers, their trial reveals how 
secondary trauma imparted through visiting conflict-zones and by watching videos that detailed Muslim 
suffering fomented a desire in them to engage in violence to gain revenge. For example, during his trial, 
Anthony Garcia recalled watching videos that displaying the atrocities perpetrated by Indian forces in 
Kashmir. The impact of these videos had on him is demonstrated by Garcia stating that:
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It was the worst thing anyone could have seen. Little children sexually abused and women... and 
I still remember it quite clearly. The effect of these videos, as Garcia recalls made him cry while 
watching the videos and as a consequence he decided to do something to help his fellow Muslims in 
Kashmir (BBC 30 April 2007).
While Garcia experienced secondary trauma through watching videos, and identified with the victims 
through the register of Islam and violence, Salahuddin Amin another member of the plot embraced extreme 
ideas after his experiences in a refugee camp in Pakistan:
There were a lot of stalls on the main road–on the Mall Road,” he said. “The stalls were set up by the 
Mujahadeen, the fighters fighting in Kashmir. I was walking up and down at one point I heard a lady 
making an emotional speech about the atrocities that were happening in Kashmir that was under 
Indian rule–how women were raped and kidnapped all the time and they had to move from there to 
Pakistani Kashmir and were in difficulties. She made a very emotional speech and that affected me. 
(BBC 30 April 2007).
For Amin the effect of hearing about the violence experienced by Pakistani Muslim women at the hands of 
Indian soldiers captivated him such that he decided to donate money, in addition to attending meetings held 
by Islamists in his hometown of Luton (BBC 30 April 2007). He identified with the woman speaker and the 
victims through the registers of ethnicity, Islam and violence.
The experiences of the above individuals highlight how violence experienced, especially by women and 
children, that can be identified with can foster a state of trauma. If we accept that the individuals were 
traumatised by their secondary experiences, this means that they have not fulfilled the prerequisite criterion 
that legitimates human bombing as documented by Abu Qatada.
Conclusion
I have argued that it is impossible to consider human bomber to be motivated by sacred intention, even if 
bombers and groups claim as such, on the basis of three issues that I consider to undermine the religious 
criteria outlined by Abu Qatada.
The first issue is one of identifying the motivations of the bomber. It is clear that the bombers have multiple 
motivations, including, escapism, family honour and politics of representation. Moreover, the human bomber 
is not acting from absolute knowledge of God’s path and certainty of the outcomes that will be beneficial 
to Muslims, but on trust and uncertainty of the outcomes. Even, if we accept that the bomber may have 
sacred intention, the standard is such that Ali, the fourth Caliph found it difficult to uphold, as the story 
documenting the battle of Ditch highlights.
The second issue is the groups assuming that they know the ‘real’ motivations of the bomber and these 
motivations are in the path of God. In declaring knowledge of both, the groups are assuming that they know 
the mind of God and thus elevate themselves to the God’s status. This places the groups in a precarious 
position because and outside the fold of Islam.
The final issue is the possibility of the bombers suffering from secondary trauma. Speckhard (2012) argues 
that secondary trauma played a big part in compelling individuals to engage in human bombing missions 
as I have outlined. She contends that secondary trauma can occur in people that live in conflict-zones, as 
well as those who live outside them. I have argued that the 7/7 bombers and the members of the foiled 2006 
Transatlantic plot not only visited conflict-zones and witnessed violence first, they also watched videos that 
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detailed Muslim suffering; thus they were suffering from secondary trauma and did not fulfill Qatad’s criteria.
If we accept that the occurrence of either one or all of the aforementioned issues, then this ensures that no 
scared intention can exist, which means that human bombings falls outside the fold of Islam and can only be 
explained by non-religious arguments.
About the author: Mohammed Ilyas is a visiting research fellow at the department of Criminology and 
Sociologyat Middlesex University, London, UK.His research interests include human rights, political violent 
extremism, and hate crime. He is currently researching into technology and political violent extremism, blowback 
from ISIS, Muslim women and jihadism, and the unintended consequences of 9/11 for Muslims.
Notes
[1] There are a number of explanations used for the act of human bombing and the bombers themselves. Although Merari notes four types of explanations, I place 
them into two categories. The first category focuses on the individual, looking at religious fanaticism, poverty, personal trauma, revenge, and psychopathology. The 
second category tends to focus on political grievances, utilitarian concerns, and cultural reasons (Merari 2010: 125).
[2] Abu Qatada al-filistini was an extremist preacher who operated out Finsbury Park Mosque, London until his detention under anti-terrorism act in 2002. In July 
2013 he was extradited to Jordan to face terrorism charges.
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